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1 Introduction
In many societies, clientelist parties (or political machines) distribute benefits to citizens in direct
exchange for political support. Whereas scholars traditionally explored patterns of clientelism
extending beyond electoral campaigns (e.g., Banfield and Wilson 1963; Scott 1972), many recent
studies focus on how machines strategically target citizens during elections. A key debate in this
recent strand of research is whether machines use rewards to persuade or mobilize the existing
electorate (e.g., Stokes 2005; Cox 2006; Nichter 2008). We argue that this debate — and the
broader literature on clientelism — ignores important strategies because it assumes the electorate
is fixed. Machines provide rewards not only to influence the actions of the electorate, but also
to shape the composition of the electorate. One such clientelist strategy, which we term “voter
buying,” induces outsiders to transfer their electoral registration and vote for the machine.
Historical accounts of elections in the U.S. are replete with examples of voter buying. Ma-
chines in cities such as Baltimore, New York and St. Louis rewarded citizens from other districts
for “colonizing” their electoral rolls (e.g., Argersinger 1985, 675–683; Campbell 2005, 19, 161).
For instance, an 1891 news article entitled “Colonization!” examines what is described as a “time
honored” practice. Political operatives of the Tammany machine imported voters from other dis-
tricts and paid them $10, alcohol and free lodging to register fraudulently (New York Herald 1891).
In another example, a New York assemblyman was arrested during his reelection campaign in 1900
for “harboring colonizers” in a hotel and “paying them to register fraudulently.” The Elections Su-
perintendent explained that colonizers, who did not live in the district, received “free lodging until
after the election and $5 each for voting the Tammany ticket” in addition to “all they wanted to
drink and car fare” (New York Herald 1900). Despite such historic precedents for voter buying,
recent studies of clientelism rarely consider the phenomenon.
Yet evidence from around the world suggests that contemporary political machines engage
in voter buying. Kenya’s Electoral Commission recently reported that politicians often distribute
cash rewards in exchange for voter registration transfers. The agency called for efforts to block
transfers of citizens failing to meet residency requirements (East African Standard 2007). In Mex-
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ico, voter buying — frequently called “electoral tourism” — is also a familiar strategy. As just
one example, busloads of illegitimate voters were intercepted on their way to the Yucata´n during
the 2013 election (Proceso 2013).1 An imported voter explained she agreed to transfer her voter
registration because she “didn’t have money to eat for days” and was paid 1,000 pesos (US$75).
Reports of voter buying also abound in the Philippines. During the 2013 election, operatives in San
Lorenzo Village imported citizens — known as “flying voters” — and paid them 500 (US$11)
each. One citizen urged officials to “remove the nonresidents” because “we can’t allow outsiders
to rule our elections” (Philippine Daily Inquirer 2013). Newspapers also report voter buying in
Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Ghana, Jordan and Swaziland.2 Voter buying is thus observed in
various countries, motivating our investigation of the phenomenon in Brazil.
The present paper examines the logic of voter buying and offers several predictions: (1) the
strategy is most likely in small communities, (2) it inflates the electorate by importing many voters,
(3) incumbents import more voters than challengers, and (3) the strategy predominantly imports
voters from nearby districts. Qualitative evidence of voter buying in Brazil is consistent with
these predictions. Given that no direct quantitative measure of voter buying exists, we employ
indirect tests of predictions with a regression discontinuity design of voter audits. These audits,
which undermined voter buying, decreased the electorate by 12 percentage points and reduced
the likelihood of mayoral reelection by 18 percentage points. Consistent with voter buying, these
effects are significantly greater in municipalities with large voter inflows, and where neighboring
municipalities had large voter outflows. Findings are inconsistent with alternative explanations
and are robust to an alternative research design using a different dataset. Fixed-effects regressions
confirm a link between voter transfers and audit removals. Furthermore, mayors perform more
poorly in precincts with many removed voters, especially if those precincts recently imported many
voters from neighboring municipalities.
1See also complaint by four senators, Camara de Senadores, 5/8/2013.
2Africa News (March 25, 2009; August 29, 2013); BBC (October 9, 2007; November 14, 2008); El
Mundo (December 3, 2014); Sofia News Agency (September 14, 2011).
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The distinction between voter buying and several other forms of clientelism is elaborated by
the typology in Figure 1. The commonly studied strategy of “vote buying” induces voters already
registered in a machine’s district to switch their vote choices (Lehoucq 2003; Stokes 2005). Schol-
ars vigorously debate how vote buying coexists with the secret ballot (e.g., Stokes 2005; Nichter
2008; Diaz-Cayeros, Este´vez and Magaloni forthcoming), and often contend that other strategies
influence registered citizens’ actions without monitoring vote choices. For example, “abstention
buying” induces opposing voters to abstain (Cox and Kousser 1981), while “turnout buying” mobi-
lizes supporting nonvoters (Cox 2006; Nichter 2008). By contrast, “voter buying” — the focus of
this paper — shapes the electorate’s composition by importing voters registered in other districts.
Voter buying offers an alternative explanation to the secret-ballot puzzle: it rewards outsiders who
are either indifferent or machine supporters, and thus have no reason to defect once inside the
ballot booth. We focus on the understudied strategy of voter buying, but acknowledge clientelist
strategies often coexist (Dunning and Stokes 2008; Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter 2014).3
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Voter buying lies at the intersection of clientelism and fraud, because it demonstrates how clien-
telist rewards can induce registration fraud. Although excellent studies focus on fraudulent voter
registration (e.g., Fukumoto and Horiuchi 2011, Ichino and Schundeln 2012), they rarely consider
clientelist benefits, and voter buying similarly receives scant attention in more expansive studies of
electoral fraud (e.g., Lehoucq and Molina 2002, Simpser 2013). Voter buying may be considered a
form of “retail” fraud that distorts individual votes before they are cast, as opposed to “wholesale”
fraud that alters ex post vote tallies (Alvarez, Hall and Hyde 2008, 4). And unlike many forms of
electoral fraud, voter buying involves participation of citizens casting ballots (Donsanto 2008, 24).
Our study therefore contributes by bridging two bodies of literature: it underscores that clien-
telism can underpin electoral fraud. Whereas most prominent studies of electoral fraud consider
3The typology is not exhaustive. “Nonvoter buying” targets citizens neither registered in the ma-
chine’s district nor likely to vote.
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Figure 1: Clientelist Strategies During Elections
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clientelism to be a type of fraud (e.g., Alvarez, Hall and Hyde 2008, 6; Lehoucq 2003, 237-9; Zi-
blatt 2009, 4), many studies of clientelism never even mention the word “fraud” (e.g., Scott 1972;
Kitschelt 2000; Stokes 2005). Leaving conceptual issues aside, voter buying clarifies that scholars
must not overlook clientelism as a potential mechanism of electoral fraud. Studies of clientelism
should investigate whether rewards are used to induce fraud, lest they misinterpret why some ma-
chines distribute benefits. In parallel, studies of fraud should investigate mechanisms by which
politicians motivate citizens’ complicity — to what extent do rewards induce citizens to break
laws and risk fines or imprisonment? The present study advances this agenda by theoretically and
empirically linking clientelism to electoral fraud.
We also contribute to the empirical literature on how clientelism and fraud affect elections.
Within this burgeoning literature, our study is most closely related to three excellent studies that
do not investigate voter buying. First, our results corroborate Wantchekon’s (2003) finding that
clientelism disproportionately benefits incumbents. However, his field experiment examines the
impact of clientelist campaign promises and does not consider voter buying. Second, we build on
the incisive work of Fukumoto and Horiuchi (2011), who examine voter transfers across munici-
palities during Japanese city council elections. In contrast to their study, we investigate clientelism
and directly examine effects on reelection rates. Third, as with Ichino and Schundeln (2012), we
examine neighboring districts and voter registration. However, their study explores spillover ef-
fects of election observers on registration fraud, not voter buying. In sum, our unique focus on
voter buying is a substantial contribution.
2 Hypotheses
The logic of voter buying suggests four key predictions tested in the present study:
H1 Small Districts: Voter buying is more likely in small towns and villages than in cities. Several
factors render voter buying more cost effective in smaller communities. First, an imported voter is
far more likely to be pivotal in small districts, so machines must typically import fewer citizens to
change a candidate’s vote share. This logic builds on Fukumoto and Horiuchi (2011, 593–4), which
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argues registration fraud is more prevalent in small towns and villages because fewer votes sepa-
rate winners from losers. Second, voter buying is often more cost effective in small communities
because machines can more accurately monitor recipients’ compliance with clientelist transactions
(Stokes 2005, 322-3; Nichter 2008, 28). Third, politicians tend to shift campaign budgets away
from clientelism as electorates increase, because returns to scale of advertising and other program-
matic strategies are greater (Stokes et al. 2013, 181–2). Overall, voter buying is more likely in
small districts.
H2 Registration: Voter buying inflates electoral registration by importing many voters. Studies
of fraud, which do not investigate clientelist rewards, demonstrate that illegal voter registration
inflates electorates. For example, Fukumoto and Horiuchi (2011) show Japanese politicians expand
rolls by encouraging outsiders to register fraudulently before municipal elections. Likewise, Ichino
and Schundeln (2012, 293) uncover fraudulent registration in Ghana and argue parties have “strong
incentives to inflate the voters register.” With voter buying, outsiders are induced to transfer their
voter registration, which similarly expands rolls. Therefore, contexts with voter buying should
exhibit electorate increases with many voter inflows.
H3 Incumbents: Incumbents engage in more voter buying than challengers. Incumbents are ex-
pected to engage in more voter buying than challengers due to greater access to resources. Many
scholars argue incumbents have a competitive advantage at clientelism and patronage because they
can disproportionately tap public funds, social programs or government employment (e.g., Gal-
lego and Wantchekon 2012, 185; Stokes 2009, 14-5). Rigorous evidence is provided by Folke,
Hirano and Snyder (2011), who show control over public employment provided an incumbency
advantage in the historical U.S., as well as Schady (2000), who demonstrates Peru’s incumbent
president manipulated a social program for political gain. Moreover, experimental work in Benin
suggests clientelism is more effective for incumbent candidates, potentially because they can more
credibly promise to deliver rewards (Wantchekon 2003, 401, 421). Disproportionate access to
resources may enhance such credibility by enabling incumbents to develop a track record of hand-
outs (Chandra 1997, 94), as well as facilitating ongoing employment offers that are both credible
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and reversible (Robinson and Verdier 2013). Furthermore, incumbents may enjoy greater access
to human resources, such as electoral staff who process registration transfers. These advantages
suggest incumbents will typically conduct more voter buying than challengers.
H4 Neighboring Districts: Voter buying imports many voters from geographically proximal dis-
tricts. Proximity renders voter buying more cost effective due to lower transportation costs. In
contexts where machines physically transport voters to their districts, they must expend less on
labor and fuel costs when voters live in neighboring districts. This logic builds on Ichino and
Schundeln (2012, 295), who argue proximity affects the degree to which politicians fraudulently
relocate voters due to “time and resource constraints.” If politicians compensate voters for trans-
portation costs instead of physically relocating them, a similar logic suggests nearby voters require
smaller payments. Furthermore, many studies on voter behavior find distance to polling places re-
duces turnout propensity (e.g., Brady and McNulty 2011; Haspel and Knotts 2005). Analogously,
distance may be expected to affect turnout propensity among induced voters, thereby undermining
voter buying’s effectiveness. Such considerations suggest voter buying tends to import many voters
from proximal districts.
At the outset, we acknowledge these predictions are by no means exhaustive. For example,
features of electoral systems may influence voter buying. Because this study focuses exclusively
on Brazil, we do not thoroughly investigate why voter buying may be more prevalent in some
countries than others, though the Discussion section suggests why Brazil may be a propitious
environment for the strategy. We bracket such considerations and focus on providing evidence of
voter buying and testing the above hypotheses.4
2.1 Indirect Test of Hypotheses
Given that no direct quantitative measure of voter buying exists, we test hypotheses indirectly by
examining a Brazilian intervention designed to combat the phenomenon — voter audits. Voter
4A previous version of this paper formalized several of these hypotheses, adapting the models in
Stokes (2005) and Nichter (2008).
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audits undermine voter buying by inspecting a municipality’s electorate and removing ineligible
voters. These audits have never been previously analyzed and provide substantial insight about
voter buying.
The explicit purpose of voter audits — formally known as “electoral revisions” — is to com-
bat fraudulent registration, including voters induced to transfer through voter buying. Impressive
efforts in recent decades already curbed various other forms of registration fraud: one prominent
researcher even argues Brazil “practically eliminated registration fraud” by digitizing its electoral
registry and reissuing voter documents in the 1980s (Nicolau 2002, 28). To be sure, the Superior
Electoral Court (TSE) regularly employs its computerized, national database to eliminate duplicate
registrations (by cross-checking information), remove deceased voters (by processing death cer-
tificates), and identify counterfeit voting documents (by verifying ID numbers). However, illegal
transfers remain a key concern and officials emphasize audits’ crucial role in removing outsiders
from the electorate. As the president of Minas Gerais’s state electoral court recently explained,
“what justifies a revision is the existence, in the electoral rolls, of voters who don’t have links with
a municipality ... In municipal elections, one vote determines the selection of the mayor” (TRE-
MG 2011). Similarly, a state deputy in Mato Grosso argued audits improve mayoral elections by
ensuring “only people who actually live there” will vote (Va´rzea Grande 2004).
Our quantitative analyses employ a regression discontinuity design, exploiting the fact that the
TSE audits municipalities that surpass an arbitrary threshold.5 To test predictions, we investigate
whether evidence about audits is consistent with the hypotheses about voter buying elaborated
above. As shown in Figure 2, a corollary about voter audits in the Brazilian context stems from each
voter-buying hypothesis. Evidence consistent with these corollaries would thereby corroborate the
voter-buying explanation. Before rigorously testing corollaries in Figure 2, we first provide direct
qualitative evidence of voter buying in Brazil.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
5As discussed below, the TSE is considered relatively well-insulated from political influence, and
statistical tests find no evidence of partisan bias in the selection of municipalities for audits.
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Figure 2: Voter Buying Predictions
Prediction Hypothesis (Voter Buying) Corollary (Voter Audits)
1.  Small Districts Voter buying is more likely in small towns and villages than in cities
Voter audits are more likely 
in small towns and villages than in cities
2.  Registration Voter buying inflates electoral registrationby importing many voters
Voter audits reduce electoral registration 
in districts with many imported voters
3.  Incumbents  Incumbents engage in voter buying more than challengers
Incumbents are undermined by voter audits
more than challengers
4.  Neighboring Districts Voter buying imports many voters from geographically proximal districts
Voter audits remove many imported voters 
from geographically proximal districts
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3 Qualitative Evidence
Newspapers and official documents provide substantial evidence of voter buying during Brazilian
municipal elections. Mayors and councilors are elected concurrently every four years; federal
elections are held two years later. Citizens may transfer voter registration once per year, at least
150 days before an election. They must personally submit paperwork in the new municipality and
attest to living there at least three months.6
Qualitative evidence of voter buying in Brazil is consistent with above hypotheses. As pre-
dicted by Hypotheses 1 and 4, voter buying is typically observed in small municipalities — where
Brazilians are more likely to be pivotal and interact with political operatives7 — and frequently
imports voters from neighboring districts. For example, an Amazonas state newspaper explains
municipal elections are “historically marked by fraudulent transfers of voters on the periphery
of Manaus [the state’s capital] to neighboring towns,” which typically “involve free transport on
Election Day, cash payments, and promises of work” (A Critica 2011). Indeed, an investigation
by the state’s electoral court identified many voters induced with “money, gifts and transportation”
to transfer from Manaus to small nearby towns (A Critica 2011b). In Pernambuco state, prose-
cutors found operatives provided up to R$40 (US$24) to voters who transferred from Recife to a
small nearby municipality (Ministe´rio Pu´blico-PE 2008). Likewise, Rodoˆnia state imprisoned a
mayoral candidate in Alvorada do Oeste (16,853 citizens) for promising “retirement benefits, cash
and employment” to voters in neighboring municipalities in exchange for transferring their voter
registration (Ageˆncia Folha 2000).
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
6The appendix provides additional details.
7In municipalities with populations below 100,000, only 652 votes separated first and second place
mayoral candidates in 2012 — versus 29,296 votes in larger municipalities (median votes; data
from TSE). The 2010 Brazilian Electoral Panel Study finds nearly three times the prevalence of
campaign visits in small towns as in capital or large cities.
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Figure 3: Voter Transfers, State Capitals and Periphery in Brazil
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Note: Greater net transfers suggest a relatively higher share of voters transferred into than out
of a municipality. Capitals are surrounded on average by 14 municipalities within 50 km. Only
aggregate transfers are available for each municipality (i.e., inflows or outflows to all other munic-
ipalities combined), so net transfers shown do not sum to zero.
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Voter buying contributes to suspicious patterns of voter transfers between state capitals (me-
dian population: 797,759) and their neighboring municipalities (median population: 25,160 each).
Figure 3 shows small municipalities surrounding state capitals — but not capitals themselves —
experience sharp net inflows of voters during municipal elections. Yet precisely the opposite is true
during federal elections. Judicial officials point to clientelist benefits as a key explanation and in-
vestigate citizens “who change their voter residence every two years, in a pendular movement, and
present false information” (Correio Braziliense 2010). A federal deputy proposed new legislation
in response to a “pendular” shift of voters between Brası´lia and small neighboring municipalities
in Goia´s, arguing “this practice happens throughout the country.”8 For example, 11 voter-buying
recipients were arrested in 2012 for using false addresses to transfer from Brası´lia to nearby A´guas
Lindas. According to a police chief: “The voters in fact don’t reside [in the town] and presented
false documents. It’s a recurring problem. As a rule, candidate promise jobs and benefits to those
who transfer their [voter documents]” (Globo 2012).
Turning to Hypothesis 2, qualitative sources suggest voter buying inflates electoral registration
by importing many voters. A newspaper in Rio Grande do Norte state describing voter buying in
a small municipality quotes an ex-mayor as saying “Jardim de Piranhas is swollen with so many
voter transfers ... that it could burst” (O Poti 1996). Across the country in Rio Grande do Sul, court
documents discuss how registration inflows due to voter buying contributed to an “unacceptable
inflation, absolutely artificial” of electorates in several small municipalities (TRE-RS 2000). And
when a national civil society organization launched its anti-clientelism efforts in Mato Grosso state
in 2004, its first filed complaint was that voter buying led to a “swelling of voters” in a small
municipality neighboring the state’s capital (Dia´rio de Cuiaba´ 2004).
Turning to Hypothesis 3, incumbent politicians in Brazil enjoy a competitive advantage at voter
buying. Mayors, in particular, can interfere with voter registration by wielding power over munic-
ipal employees. By law, electoral offices where transfers are processed should only be staffed with
8Projeto de Lei 1866/2011, Caˆmara dos Deputados, 7/14/2011. See also Correio Braziliense
(2010b).
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civil service personnel of the judiciary. But in reality, understaffing means they often rely on work-
ers granted by the mayor’s office.9 Consider the prosecution of the mayor of Caracol, Piauı´ (10,212
citizens) for distributing clientelist benefits and illegally transferring voters during his 2008 reelec-
tion campaign. During testimony, a municipal employee in the electoral office reportedly admitted
“suffering pressure from the mayor” to process illegal transfers from neighboring municipalities
(TRE-PI 2010; Saraiva Reporter 2011). In Goia´s state, authorities arrested a municipal worker in
Alexaˆnia (23,814 citizens) for facilitating voter buying: she processed illegal transfers of induced
voters from two neighboring municipalities after receiving documents from a candidate’s nephew
(Jornal Estado de Goia´s 2010). Voter buying is also easier for incumbent mayors (and allied
councilors) because of preferential access to public employment and programs. For example, the
mayor of Rio da Conceic¸a˜o, Tocantins (1,714 citizens) was charged for offering public employ-
ment to an illegally imported voter during reelection efforts (Ministerio Pu´blico Federal 2008). In
Nova Ipixuna, Para´ (14,645 citizens), a councilor provided Seguro Defeso benefits as voter-buying
rewards. According to federal charges in 2011, he manipulated this program — which assists poor
fishermen during breeding season — to reward imported voters who didn’t even fish (Ministerio
Pu´blico Federal 2011). All in all, qualitative evidence from Brazil is consistent with voter-buying
hypotheses in Figure 2.
4 Quantitative Evidence
Given this qualitative evidence of voter buying, we now employ a regression discontinuity design
(RDD) to investigate voter audits. The voter-buying explanation is strengthened to the extent that
voter audits are consistent with corollaries in Figure 2. While testing corollaries, analyses below
focus on two outcome variables: voter registration and mayoral reelection. Consistent with voter
buying, audits reduce both registration and reelection. Furthermore, effects are significantly greater
in municipalities with large voter inflows, and where neighboring municipalities had large voter
outflows.
9Author’s interview with Judge Marlon Reis, 8/9/2013.
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Voter audits are conducted at the municipal level; the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) orders
local electoral courts to re-register all voters in each specified municipality. The RDD exploits a
TSE rule about voter audits: they are triggered if the electorate exceeds 80 percent of a munic-
ipality’s population. Comparing outcomes for municipalities just below and above this arbitrary
threshold enables us to estimate causal effects of audits. Strong internal validity is a substantial ad-
vantage of the RDD approach: it isolates causal effects of audits for municipalities at the threshold.
This feature is particularly important because audited and unaudited municipalities exhibit various
differences. For example, audited municipalities tend to be smaller, more rural, and exhibit less
population growth. Although a common critique is that RDDs offer strong internal validity at the
expense of external validity, an important feature of our dataset mitigates this concern. Many mu-
nicipalities are near the 80-percent threshold, so our estimation sample contains over one-quarter
of Brazilian municipalities. We also demonstrate robustness of findings to an alternative research
design including municipalities farther from the threshold (a fixed-effects analysis of precincts in
Bahia state).
In 2007, the average municipality’s electorate represented 74.4 percent of its population; 1,483
of Brazil’s 5,564 municipalities exceeded the 80-percent threshold. Two other criteria must also
be met to trigger an audit, but the 80-percent threshold is reached by far fewer municipalities and
thus has the greatest influence on the probability of an audit.10 Another relatively minor source of
audits is state electoral courts, which can authorize them in municipalities by randomly conducting
home visits of five percent of voters and demonstrating substantial registration irregularities.
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
10The other two criteria are: (a) electorate is at least double the summed population of citizens
aged 10-15 and over 70 years; and (b) voter transfers increased at least 10% over the past year.
Whereas 27% of Brazil’s municipalities fulfill the 80% criterion, over 99% fulfill (a) and over
60% fulfill (b). Three-fourths of municipalities over the 80% threshold meet both other criteria.
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We analyze the 2007-08 wave of voter audits, which was the most comprehensive in decades
and constituted nearly one-third of all audits conducted over the past 15 years.11 Figure 4a demon-
strates the discontinuous increase in audits at the 80-percent threshold, though this rule was not
completely deterministic. Election officials did not conduct audits in one-fourth of municipalities
above the threshold, as they did not meet the other two TSE criteria. Furthermore, they conducted
audits in five percent of municipalities below the threshold, due to the state-level process. Because
audit assignment was not completely deterministic, “sharp” RDD methods are inappropriate as
they would yield biased estimates of audits’ effects. To account for this “fuzzy” discontinuity, we
treat the issue as a non-compliance problem, as is standard in the program evaluation literature
(Angrist and Lavy 1999, 259-267).
4.1 Corollary 1: Small Districts
Before analyzing the RDD, we note audits predominantly target small municipalities — consistent
with Corollary 1. During the extensive 2007-08 audit wave, Brazil audited only two municipalities
with populations over 90,000 citizens; three-fourths of audited municipalities have under 11,300
citizens. As shown in Figure 4b, the key audit trigger — the electorate-population ratio discussed
above — is inversely related to municipality size. Due to the targeting of small municipalities,
only 5.4 percent of the nation’s electorate (6.8 million voters) had to re-register, but they lived in
23 percent of Brazil’s municipalities (TSE 2007). In short, audits are most likely in small districts,
consistent with voter buying.
4.2 Regression Discontinuity Design
To formally introduce the RDD, let Ri be a binary variable denoting whether municipality i under-
went an audit and let Ei be the “forcing” variable (i.e., electorate-population ratio). Ai is a dummy
variable indicating Ei exceeds the threshold. Using potential outcomes notation, Yi(Ri, Ai) is the
realized outcome when a municipality receives an audit (or not), and when it is above the threshold
11Funding constraints inhibited previous waves of audits; this problem was rectified in 2007-08.
See TSE Resolutions 20.769 (2001), 21.490 (2003), 22.050 (2005), and 22.586 (2007).
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(or not). Similarly, let Ri(Ai) indicate whether the municipality was audited when above or below
the threshold. The RDD method assumes smoothness (continuity) of potential outcomes at the
threshold (Hahn, Todd and Van der Klaauw 2001). One might question this assumption because
mayors who employ voter buying might attempt to manipulate their electorate-population data to
fall below the threshold. Evidence suggests no such manipulation. First, indicators such as margin
of victory, campaign resources, and candidate age (a proxy for experience) do not vary signifi-
cantly across different values of the forcing variable.12 But even if mayors exert effort to influence
their electorate-population ratio, prominent work by Lee (2008) demonstrates such manipulation
does not bias RDD estimations unless agents have precise control over the forcing variable. And
in Brazil, mayors do not have precise control, which would require changing the municipality’s
electorate precisely, and knowing exactly the population of her municipality (or vice versa). As
shown in the appendix, both conditions are impossible. The electorate size was in flux for various
reasons outside of mayors’ precise control including deaths, cancellations, new registrations and
outflows. Moreover, the TSE did not calculate the electorate statistics — and the census bureau
did not release the population estimates — utilized in the ratio until months after the last date on
which mayors could import voters. There is also no evidence of involvement of higher-level offi-
cials. The TSE is considered relatively well-insulated from political influence,13 and balance tests
discussed below suggest mayors who are co-partisans with the president or their governor are not
disproportionately under (or over) the threshold. The appendix provides extensive further evidence
against sorting, including results from a McCrary Density Test (McCrary 2008). Consistent with
the smoothness assumption, this formal test similarly finds no evidence of manipulation.
Given the smoothness assumption, the RDD approach estimates the following quantity:
τA = E[Yi(Ri, 1) − Yi(Ri, 0)|Ei = 80]
In our case, τA is the effect of a municipality being above or below the threshold (the reduced form
estimate) at the discontinuity point irrespective of audit status. As established by Angrist, Imbens
12See online appendix.
13Metrics such as judge tenure and appointment also point to the TSE’s independence (Rosas 2010).
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and Rubin (1996), making three assumptions — (1) crossing the threshold only affects the outcome
through implementation of audits (“exclusion” restriction), (2) there exists a “first stage” effect of
crossing the threshold on audits, and (3) monotonicity14 — enables us to estimate the following
quantity using an instrumental variables approach:
τR = E[Yi(1, Ai) − Yi(0, Ai)|Ei = 80,Ri(1) > Ri(0)]
In words, τR is the treatment effect for municipalities with Ei = 80 that are audited due to surpass-
ing the threshold. The exclusion assumption is reasonable given that no other interventions are
triggered at the threshold and there are no substantive reasons why being just above or below the
threshold would directly change political outcomes. Figure 4a shows the first-stage condition is
met as the proportion of municipalities audited jumps sharply at Ei = 80.15
4.2.1 Specification
The RDD identifies the average treatment effect for municipalities at the threshold that were au-
dited in accordance with the 80-percent trigger. Estimating this quantity requires two primary
choices: the estimator and the amount of data to retain around the discontinuity (i.e., the “band-
width”). We employ a local linear estimator (with a bandwidth of ±4 percent) and show robustness
to a difference-in-means estimator (with a bandwidth of ±1.5 percent). These bandwidths were
selected to ensure covariate balance on a wide range of variables, while leaving sufficient data to
estimate treatment effects precisely.16 The appendix demonstrates robustness to a wide array of
alternative bandwidth choices (even bandwidths of ±0.5 percent and ±0.25 percent, respectively),
14The monotonicity assumption stipulates there are no municipalities that would receive an audit
if they failed to cross the threshold, but that would not be audited if they did cross Ei = 80. This
scenario is implausible in Brazil.
15The appendix presents formal “first stage” estimates. The first stage effect of being above the
discontinuity on being audited is large (coefficient of .72) and highly statistically significant.
16Automatic bandwidth selection algorithms by Ludwig and Miller (2007) and Imbens and Kalya-
naraman (2012) recommended implausibly large bandwidths that could introduce bias by using
data far from the threshold.
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as well as placebo tests showing insignificant results if thresholds other than the true 80-percent
audit trigger are employed.
To estimate τA (the “reduced form”), we use OLS. For local linear estimates, we employ the
following model:
Yi = α + β · (Ei − 80) + τA · Ai + γ · (Ei − 80) · Ai + i
This model allows for a linear relationship between the outcome and the forcing variable to be es-
timated separately on each side of the discontinuity within the bandwidth window. For difference-
in-means specifications, we estimate a bivariate regression with a treatment indicator for whether
the municipality is above the 80-percent threshold. To estimate τR, we use the two stage least
square analogues of the reduced form equations where we instrument compliance status (Ri) with
Ai within the discontinuity window (Angrist and Pischke, 2008, p. 262). We use Hubert-White
(“robust”) standard errors, which account for any heteroskedasticity.
4.2.2 Data
We employ electoral data from the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) and demographic data from the
Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA). The TSE’s audit trigger utilized municipalities’
electorates in June 2006 and populations in July 2006. Given Brazil’s mayors may only serve
two consecutive four-year terms, for all specifications examining incumbent reelection, we only
consider municipalities with first-term mayors. We determined eligibility for reelection in 2008 by
matching names of 2000 mayoral winners to names of 2004 mayoral winners. The online appendix
provides descriptive statistics for all variables.
4.2.3 Assessing Validity of the Design
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]
To ensure RDD validity, we confirm balance of covariates on each side of the threshold. Fig-
ure 5 displays balance statistics for 30 covariates for three specifications (see caption). The figure
suggests excellent overall covariate balance. Compared with the full sample, the RDD increases
balance for nearly all covariates. For local linear specifications — our main specification — all
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30 covariates are balanced (i.e., they are not statistically significant at the 5 percent level). For
difference-in-means specifications — used as a robustness check — 28 of 30 covariates are bal-
anced (at the 5 percent level). For this latter estimator, note that observed imbalances in win margin
would likely bias our estimates against finding evidence in favor of our predictions. The online
appendix shows all findings are robust to using parametric covariate adjustment to control for all
variables with standardized differences higher than 0.10, as well as including state fixed effects.
4.3 Corollary 2: Registration
We turn to the registration corollary: if voter buying increases the electorate, then voter audits
should reduce the electorate (see Figure 2). Consistent with this prediction, Figure 6a reveals
audits removed a substantial number of voters from the rolls. The plot shows the conditional
expectation of the change in the electorate size (as a percentage of the population) on both sides of
the 80-percent audit trigger.17 Table 1 presents both the reduced form estimates (τˆA) and estimates
accounting for noncompliance (τˆR); our discussion focuses on local linear estimates adjusted for
compliance. The electorate in municipalities just below the trigger increased 4.2 percentage points,
compared to a decrease of 5.0 percentage points just above the trigger, corresponding to a reduced
form estimated effect of -9.2 percentage points. When non-compliance is taken into account, the
estimated treatment effect (τR) rises to -12.5 percentage points. In other words, audits removed
roughly 1,900 voters from the typical municipality, consistent with Corollary 2 and voter buying.
Table 1 shows this decrease in registered voters is also reflected in lower turnout (as a percentage
of the population); the estimated treatment effect adjusting for non-compliance is -6.0 percentage
points.
[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE]
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
17Analyses compare electorate sizes before and after the TSE updated rolls with audit results
(November 2007 and May 2008, respectively).
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Table 1: Effect of Voter Audits on Brazil’s 2008 Municipal Elections (RDD Estimates)
Outcome τˆA SEτA τˆR SEτR Baseline n
Local Linear Specification
Change in Registration (%) −9.22 0.65 −12.46 0.70 4.18 1477
Change in Turnout (%) −4.31 0.51 − 5.99 0.65 5.36 1477
Incumbent Reelected −0.15 0.06 − 0.18 0.08 0.53 1107
Incumbent Party Reelected −0.11 0.05 − 0.13 0.07 0.36 1477
Incumbent Runs for Reelection −0.08 0.05 − 0.10 0.07 0.75 1107
Change in Incumbent Vote Share (%) −3.73 1.41 − 5.20 1.94 3.73 802
Difference-in-Means Specification
Change in Registration (%) −8.73 0.55 −11.93 0.63 3.72 577
Change in Turnout (%) −3.97 0.42 − 5.49 0.55 5.07 577
Incumbent Reelected −0.12 0.05 − 0.16 0.07 0.52 428
Incumbent Party Reelected −0.08 0.04 − 0.11 0.05 0.36 577
Incumbent Runs for Reelection −0.10 0.04 − 0.14 0.06 0.76 428
Change in Incumbent Vote Share (%) −3.25 1.17 − 4.72 1.69 3.53 307
τˆA: local average effect of municipality with electorate-population ratio over 80% (“reduced form”); SEτA is its “robust”
standard error. τˆR: estimated local average effect of audit; SEτR is its “robust” standard error. Baseline estimates value
of dependent variable among controls at Ei = 80. For Incumbent Reelected, Incumbent Runs for Reelection, and
Change in Incumbent Vote Share, sample includes only municipalities with incumbents eligible for reelection.
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4.4 Corollary 3: Incumbency
We turn to the incumbency corollary: if incumbents engage in more voter buying than challengers,
then voter audits should disproportionately undermine incumbents’ electoral prospects (see Fig-
ure 2). Audits can influence incumbent reelection through two channels: (1) the decision to run
for office again, and (2) the share of votes received if the incumbent decides to run. Our primary
dependent variable is simply whether the incumbent mayor retained power, regardless of whether
she ran for reelection. This formulation is optimal because the TSE announced which municipal-
ities would be audited over a year before the 2008 election; some audited mayors may have thus
considered reelection tougher and opted not to re-run. As a result, conditioning on the decision to
re-run would risk post-treatment bias (Rosenbaum 1984). However, as a robustness check, we also
present treatment effects on incumbent vote share, which requires us to subset on municipalities
where the incumbent re-ran. In addition to examining effects on incumbent victory and vote share,
we examine audits’ effect on whether the incumbent party wins again, which does not require
conditioning on eligibility for reelection.
Findings are consistent with the incumbency corollary and voter buying. Figure 6b presents
the effect of audits on incumbents’ continuity of power. Each dot represents the percentage of in-
cumbents reelected (in bins of 20 municipalities). A clear discontinuity exists between the average
reelection rate immediately above and below the 80-percent threshold. As reported in Table 1,
the audit’s local average effect is -.18 (significant at the 5 percent level). To put this estimate in
perspective, a typical incumbent has a baseline probability of reelection of about 53 percent, but
after an audit her probability of victory falls to only 35 percent.
Focusing on incumbent parties, rather than just incumbent mayors, also yields effects consis-
tent with predictions. Table 1 reports statistically significant, albeit smaller, negative audit effects
on the probability of incumbent party victory. The incumbent-parties result appears to be entirely
driven by the effect on the incumbent herself: when estimating the effect on the sample of mu-
nicipalities with incumbents ineligible for reelection, the point estimate is small and statistically
insignificant (not shown).
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Recall that audits can affect the continuity of power through an incumbent’s decision about
whether to run and/or her electoral performance. We find evidence of both mechanisms. The point
estimates on the incumbent’s probability of re-running are negative and on the order of -.10, albeit
imprecisely estimated. While not consistently significant, the point estimates are large enough to
suggest strategic dropout could be a mechanism by which audits affect whether incumbents remain
in power.
Whereas above analyses examine the share of incumbent mayors retaining power — a measure
robust to strategic candidate dropout — we also consider incumbent vote share. This alternative
measure requires conditioning on the incumbent re-running. However, note sample selection bias
induced by differential candidate dropout would most likely downwardly bias our estimates since
weaker candidates would be less likely to run again. Ignoring this issue, we find a statistically
significant effect of about -5.2 percentage points.18 The magnitude of this effect exceeds the vote
margin in over a third of Brazil’s 2008 municipal elections, suggesting why relatively small swings
in vote share can reduce reelection rates.
4.5 Corollary 4: Neighboring Districts
Just as RDD estimates are consistent with the registration and incumbency corollaries, so too are
heterogeneous treatment effects of the RDD consistent with the neighboring districts corollary.
Audits are expected to harm a machine’s electoral prospects more sharply if it recently imported
many voters from neighboring districts through voter buying. Thus, the negative effect on reg-
istration and mayoral reelection should be greater if: (1) many voters recently transferred out of
neighboring municipalities, and (2) many voters recently transferred into the municipality.19
[FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE]
18Vote share measured as a percentage of population. Following Manski (1995), assuming audits
would have a greater negative effect on dropouts’ vote share, an audit’s effect unconditional on
re-running is contained within nonparametric bounds of -5.8 and -37.9 percentage points.
19Precinct-level data below provides an even more direct test.
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Figure 7: Effects of Voter Audits by Level of Voter Transfers (RDD Estimates)
Figure 7 shows how audit effects on registration and incumbent reelection vary by whether munic-
ipality has above-median voter transfers into the municipality (panels a and d) and out of neighbor-
ing municipalities (panels b and e). Panels c and f show how effects vary by whether municipality
has above-median levels of both transfers in and transfers out of neighbors. Difference between
strata effects is also shown (i.e., the “interaction”). Vertical lines represent 95% confidence inter-
vals.
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To test predictions, we first split our sample by median transfers into municipalities (180 vot-
ers). Figures 7a and 7d show how an audit’s effect on voter registration and incumbents’ continuity
of power varies by whether inflows are above or below-median. For both registration and reelec-
tion, the difference is substantial. The effect on registration in below-median municipalities is
just -11.3 percentage points, versus -14.7 percentage points in above-median municipalities. The
difference between these estimates (labeled “difference” in the plot) is statistically significant. In-
cumbent reelection is even more striking. We find no effect of audits on incumbent reelection
in below-median municipalities: the point estimate of -0.05 is statistically insignificant. By con-
trast, in above-median municipalities, the effect is a -0.32 change in probability of winning. For
both outcomes, consistent with voter buying, audit effects are substantially larger if many voters
recently transferred into the municipality.
Furthermore, a similarly large degree of heterogeneity emerges when splitting the sample by
median transfers out of neighboring municipalities (1,646 transfers). Figures 7b and 7e reveal
effects on both registration and reelection are substantially larger in municipalities with above-
median neighbor outflows. Similar to findings above, audits do not affect the average probability
of incumbent victory when neighboring municipalities have relatively few outflows.
We next stratified data by whether a municipality met both criteria — that is, above-median
inflows and above-median transfers out of neighboring municipalities. Figures 7c and 7f show
heterogeneity across municipalities meeting both criteria versus those that did not. Once again,
differences across strata are dramatic. Both registration and mayoral reelection are cut signifi-
cantly more in districts meeting both criteria. And the effect of audits on reelection is statistically
indistinguishable from 0 in municipalities that do not meet both transfer criteria. In sum, find-
ings for both registration and incumbent reelection are consistent with the neighboring districts
corollary and voter buying.
4.6 Alternative Explanations
Evidence thus far corroborates the four corollaries in Figure 2, consistent with voter buying. We
now show RDD findings are inconsistent with four key alternative explanations.
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First, consider emigration. According to this explanation, audits remove voters who previously
emigrated from small municipalities to cities but failed to transfer their voter registration. One ma-
jor problem with this explanation: Brazil automatically cancels the voter registration of “missing
voters” — citizens who fail to vote or justify their absence in three consecutive elections. Further-
more, some elections have two rounds, with each round counting as a missed election. In addition,
absentee voting is generally forbidden in Brazil. Thus, emigration resulting from longer-term pat-
terns of urbanization can account for audit removals only in cases where city dwellers return to
their birthplaces every two years to vote (or alternatively, repeatedly justify their absence).
Emigration is also inconsistent with RDD findings. If emigration were a valid explanation, one
would expect audits to have a greater impact on registration and mayoral reelection in municipal-
ities with higher emigration rates. To test this possibility, we obtained 2010 census data on the
percentage of citizens in each municipality who emigrated between 2005 and 2010. As shown
in Figure 8a, treatment effects on both outcomes are not heterogeneous across emigration rates,
pointing away from emigration as an alternative explanation.20 Overall, evidence does not support
the emigration explanation.
[FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE]
A second alternative explanation is that audits undermine incumbents’ reelection prospects
by disproportionately removing legitimate voters who are incumbent supporters. Undermining
incumbents requires asymmetric cancellations, so the most compelling argument employing this
logic involves elderly voters. Voters at least 70 years old are exempt from compulsory voting laws
and consequently may be less likely to re-register after an audit. If elderly voters are dispropor-
tionately pro-incumbent, then incumbents could conceivably lose at higher rates after an audit. To
test this possibility, Figure 8b compares audit effects in municipalities with above versus below-
median percentages of citizens aged 70 years and older. The elderly hypothesis does not hold
20The appendix shows effects are not heterogeneous by three additional proxies of emigration,
including pre-audit voter outflows.
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Figure 8: Test of Alternative Explanations (Heterogeneity of RDD Estimates)
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up — one would expect audits to have a greater impact on registration and mayoral reelection in
municipalities with disproportionately more elderly voters. Yet treatment effects are not hetero-
geneous across this variable. Moreover, analyses suggest the elderly account for only 15 percent
of the overall electorate decrease experienced during audits (not shown). Overall, evidence points
away from the elderly hypothesis.
A third alternative explanation involves disinterested voters. One might hypothesize such vot-
ers are less likely to re-register and are disproportionately pro-incumbent. The 2010 Brazilian
Electoral Panel Study suggests blank and invalid votes can be used as a proxy for disinterest in
politics (see appendix). If this alternative hypothesis holds, one would expect audits to have a
greater impact on registration and mayoral reelection in municipalities with above-median blank
and invalid votes. But as shown in Figure 8c, treatment effects are not heterogeneous across this
variable.
Finally, a fourth alternative explanation is that audits reduce reelection rates by exposing may-
ors’ malfeasance regarding electoral rolls. The underlying logic is that when audits uncover in-
cumbents’ illicit tactics, voters learn this information, update perceptions about incumbents, and
punish them electorally. One would thereby expect audit effects on reelection to be magnified
in municipalities with local media to report about audits. Excellent work by Ferraz and Finan
(2008) — which investigates audits of federal funds (in 373 Brazilian municipalities) instead of
voter audits — finds precisely this result. But voter audits exhibit no such pattern, belying this
alternative explanation. We follow Ferraz and Finan (2008, 2011) by examining heterogeneity by
presence of radio station. Unlike their study, Figure 8d shows voter audits are not heterogeneous
by whether municipalities have radio stations. This explanation also cannot explain findings within
municipalities, as discussed below. Overall, evidence is inconsistent with alternative explanations.
5 Robustness at the Precinct Level
As further corroboration of predictions, we employ an alternative research design using precinct-
level data from Bahia, the state where audits are most prevalent. Fixed-effects regressions ex-
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ploiting within-municipality variation establish that transfers from neighboring municipalities are
correlated with the share of voters purged from the electorate during audits (“audit removals”).
Furthermore, incumbents perform more poorly in precincts with many audit removals, especially
those recently importing voters from neighboring municipalities. At the outset, we note the RDD
approach above offers greater internal validity; inferences from this fixed-effects analysis rest on
stronger assumptions. Also, we do not claim Bahia is representative of the entire country; for in-
stance, it is relatively poor and is the most populous state in Northeast Brazil (with 15.1 million
citizens).21 Despite these limitations, specifications below offer two advantages. First, because
specifications below suggest audit effects are robust at the precinct level, they help to rule out
any potential alternative explanation for audit effects that operates at the municipal level (e.g.,
campaign effects). Second, our data requests yielded richer transfer data to test hypotheses — in
addition to the number of transfers, for Bahia we know where voters departed from and arrived to.
These granular data enable us to investigate more directly whether effects are larger where more
transfers originated from neighboring municipalities. When the RDD and fixed-effects results are
considered jointly, they provide compelling evidence of voter buying.
5.1 Data and Statistical Model
The fixed-effects analysis examines precinct-level data in Bahia, where 42 percent of municipalities
were audited during the 2007-08 wave. To examine effects of audits on incumbent reelection, we
analyze audited municipalities where the incumbent mayor ran for reelection in 2008. In Bahia,
140 audited municipalities had mayors eligible for reelection; 89 of these mayors ran for reelection.
This decision to seek reelection is potentially affected by the degree to which an audit reshapes
the electorate, which would induce sample selection bias. Reassuringly, however, there is no
correlation between the decision to re-run and the percentage of voters removed by audits. Even
still, if weak incumbents disproportionately drop out when audited for fear of losing, comparatively
21We obtained precinct-level data on audit removals and transfers directly from Bahia’s state elec-
toral court during fieldwork. Multiple requests for comparable data nationally were unsuccessful.
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stronger incumbents will be over-represented in the estimation sample. If strong incumbents are
less affected by audits, then our coefficient estimates for incumbent vote share will be downwardly
biased and thus conservative.
We estimate the effect of transfers from neighboring municipalities on audit voter removals
using this specification:
Ri = δTi + cm + Xiβ + i
The dependent variable Ri is the number of voters purged during an audit as a percentage of 2004
registered voters in precinct i. The primary independent variable Ti is a variable measuring the
number of transfers from neighboring municipalities. The term cm is a municipality-specific fixed
effect. Xi is a vector of control variables including a rural-precinct dummy, logged registered voters
in 2004, percentage of voters affiliated with the incumbent’s party, and percentage affiliated with
any party. We estimate audit effects on electoral outcomes employing this specification:22
yi,2008 − yi,2004 = τRi + cm + Xiβ + i
The dependent variable yi,2008 − yi,2004 is the change in votes (as a percent of valid votes) received
by the incumbent between 2004 and 2008.23
Table 2 presents results of the precinct-level analysis. Columns 1 and 2 show a statistically
significant positive correlation between transfers from neighboring municipalities and voters re-
moved by audits. In column 1, we follow our RDD specifications by examining a dummy variable
22Because we employ a first-differenced dependent variable and municipality fixed effects, this
specification is equivalent to a difference-in-differences model with precinct-specific fixed effects
and municipality-by-year fixed effects. We model Ri’s effect as linear because inclusion of higher
order terms for a more flexible specification showed no improvement in model fit.
23Due to growth in the number of precincts, 20% of 2008 precincts could not be matched to 2004
precincts. However, missingness in 2004 is uncorrelated with audit cancellations and incumbent
vote share in 2008 (conditioning on municipality fixed effects), suggesting sample selection will
not contaminate estimates. Estimates employ data for precincts observed in both periods.
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indicating above or below-median inflows from neighbors. We find precincts with above-median
inflows experienced significantly more audit removals than below-median precincts. The estimated
coefficient represents 18 percent of a standard deviation of audit removals in precincts within our
sample. Column 2 employs logged neighbor transfers and similarly finds a significant positive
association.
In columns 3 through 5, we examine the effect of audit removals on changes in incumbent vote
shares between 2004 and 2008. Column 3 shows that the percentage of voters purged due to audits
is negatively associated with change in incumbent vote share. This magnitude implies in a typical
precinct, a 10 percentage point increase in audit removals is associated with a 1 percentage point
decrease in incumbent vote share.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Considerably stronger effects on reelection are observed if a precinct recently imported many
voters from neighboring municipalities. Paralleling the RDD heterogeneous treatment effects anal-
ysis, column 4 examines whether incumbent vote shares fall more in precincts that had above-
median transfers from neighbors over the previous two years. Consistent with Section 4.5, the
negative effects of audits in columns 1-2 are almost entirely driven by such precincts. In precincts
with below-median transfers from neighbors, the point estimate is negative but small and statis-
tically insignificant. In precincts with above-median transfers from neighbors, the effect of a 10
percentage point increase in audit removals is a substantially larger 1.8 percentage point decrease
in incumbent vote share — over 10 times that in below-median precincts. Column 4 shows a sim-
ilar pattern using logged transfers as the interaction variable. To contextualize these estimates,
the median Bahian precinct lost about 15 percent of its electorate due to audits, resulting in a 3
percentage point loss in incumbent vote share (based on column 4) in precincts with above-median
transfers from neighbors. Given the high competitiveness of many mayoral elections in Bahia
— 13 percent had vote margins of less than 3 percent — voter audits likely tipped the electoral
outcome in many municipalities.
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Table 2: Precinct-Level Results for Bahia State
Dependent variable:
Audit Removals Change in Incumbent Vote Share (04-08)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Transfers from Neighbors (Above Median) 0.97∗∗ 2.27∗
(0.16) (0.97)
Transfers from Neighbors (Logged) 0.94∗∗ 2.03
(0.20) (1.13)
% Audit Removals −0.10∗∗ −0.01 −0.04
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
% Audit Removals x −0.18∗∗
Transfers from Neighbors (Above Median) (0.06)
% Audit Removals x −0.18∗
Transfers from Neighbors (Logged) (0.07)
Municipality Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,535 3,535 3,224 3,224 3,224
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. See text for definitions of variables.
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Overall, the fixed-effects specifications are remarkably similar to RDD findings, even though
they employ a distinct research design and a different dataset. Taken together, they provide sub-
stantial evidence in line with predictions of voter buying.
6 Discussion
Evidence of voter buying challenges a fundamental assumption underlying studies of clientelism.
Although scholars typically assume rewards influence actions of the existing electorate, they may
also shape the electorate. Beyond influencing vote choices and turnout, clientelist benefits can
induce outsiders to transfer their voter registration and deliver political support. Voter buying also
bridges the literature on clientelism and fraud, because it demonstrates how contingent benefits
serve as a mechanism of registration fraud. Our empirical analyses (using both RDD and fixed-
effects specifications) suggest voter buying has substantial effects on both voter registration and
mayoral reelection in some Brazilian municipalities. Our findings lay the groundwork for an im-
portant research agenda: conducting theoretical and empirical work on the various ways in which
clientelism may induce citizens’ participation in fraud.
The concept we introduce — voter buying — travels far beyond Brazil. This paper’s introduc-
tion provides evidence about its existence in 10 additional countries: Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria,
Ghana, Jordan, Kenya, Mexico, the Philippines, Swaziland, and the historic U.S. To test external
validity more thoroughly, cross-national survey research should investigate voter buying’s preva-
lence. The external validity of hypotheses posited in this paper are also an important research
question; in different contexts, other hypotheses may prove to be salient. For example, politicians
across districts could plausibly compete or collude with each other for voters, with variation across
co-partisanship. No such patterns are observed in Brazil, potentially reflecting weak partisanship in
local-level politics. Other hypotheses might involve how specific contextual differences shape the
extent to which challengers as well as incumbents pursue voter buying and other forms of fraud
(see Cantu´ 2013). Overall, the generalizability of voter buying and specific hypotheses deserve
further investigation.
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Another important avenue for future research is examining how machines combine voter buy-
ing and other strategies of clientelism. Machines may employ more voter buying in contexts with
rigorous ballot secrecy, because it does not require monitoring vote choices. Voter buying may also
be attractive where stringent compulsory voting inhibits turnout buying. These considerations sug-
gest why Brazil may be a propitious environment for voter buying: Brazil became the first country
in the world to introduce fully electronic voting in 2000 (undermining vote buying), and penalizes
abstention with substantial bureaucratic hassles (undermining turnout buying). As a next step, for-
mal and empirical research should investigate how various factors — including ballot secrecy and
compulsory voting — affect portfolios of clientelism that include voter buying.
Future research should also examine how politicians trade off voter buying with other forms
of electoral fraud. For example, machines may find it cheaper to pad electoral rolls with fictitious
“ghost voters” before an election, or rejigger ballot totals after an election. In Brazil, voter buying
became relatively more attractive as a national computerized registry undermined other registration
fraud, and electronic voting hampered fraud after voting. The latter technology obviated various
common strategies, such as adding votes to tabulation sheets, claiming opposition votes were illeg-
ible, and filling out candidates’ names on blank ballots (Estado de Sa˜o Paulo 1994, 1994b). On the
other hand, voter audits investigated in this study had implications for preventing voter buying. The
strategy became relatively less attractive as audits expunged many imported voters from the rolls,
and as politicians in audited municipalities faced charges of voter buying (e.g., Ministerio Pu´blico
Federal 2008). The impact of future policy and technological shifts remains uncertain. Brazil is
installing biometric voting, which could suppress voter buying by requiring broad re-registration,
but could also stimulate substitution towards voter buying if other fraudulent strategies become
impossible. How such factors affect trade-offs between voter buying and broader tools of electoral
fraud warrants further attention.
Overall, this study challenges scholars to deepen their understanding about the logic by which
machines distribute contingent benefits. Our analyses encourage researchers to pay closer attention
to the ways in which clientelist exchanges may underpin electoral fraud. Given that voter buying
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dramatically influences municipal elections in Brazil, such unexplored phenomena may well have
substantial effects on the practice of democracy across the world.
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A Additional Details about Voter Transfers
Voter buying in Brazil involves the active participation of recipients, who must file transfer requests
in the electoral office of the new municipality. They must apply in person and present a federally
issued ID, birth or marriage certificate, and proof of military service or exemption.24 In addition,
they must have voted or justified their absence in all previous elections, or otherwise pay abstention
fines.25 Transfer requests must be filed at least 150 days prior to an election, and citizens may only
transfer once per year. Citizens must also be residents of the new municipality for at least three
months before applying for transfers.
This residential requirement does not pose a substantial barrier for voter buying in Brazil for
two reasons. First, voters self-declare where they live “under penalty of law,” and their statements
are typically “presumed to be true” without official verification.26 And second, the concept of
“electoral residence” extends well beyond where someone lives. Brazilian electoral law employs a
definition that is “more flexible and elastic, identifying residence with the place where the applicant
has political or social links.”27 If a citizen does not physically reside in a municipality, a citizen
can claim various other links to the municipality. It is at the discretion of the local electoral judge,
“on a case-by-case basis,” whether the rationale is deemed sufficient to warrant a transfer.28 For
example, an electoral judge in Amazonas even approved a voter’s claim of residence on the basis
that he was romantically involved with someone in the municipality (Ramalho 2008: 23).
24Since 2007, Brazilians can fill out their own information on the internet to expedite registration,
but must still go to electoral offices to show ID and documentation.
25This requirement applies for all citizens for whom voting is mandatory (i.e., literate voters aged
18 to 70 years).
26See Electoral Laws 6.996/1982, 7.115/1983, and 21.538/2003. However, in some instances,
voters may be asked to show proof of residence.
27Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, Acorda˜o 16.397/2000.
28Interview with Cibelle Barbosa, Tribunal Regional Eleitoral de Minas Gerais, January 30, 2011.
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B Additional Details about Voter Audits
Voter audits are always conducted at the municipal level. That is, regardless whether upcoming
elections are municipal or federal, the TSE examines municipal-level data and assigns audits. The
local electoral court is then ordered to re-register all voters in a specified municipality.
Descriptive evidence suggests that audits are most likely during municipal elections in Brazil.
First, consider an important temporal pattern: the TSE orders most audits (78 percent in 1997-
2012) during the six-month window before it finalizes the electoral rolls for each upcoming elec-
tion. During such windows over the last 15 years, nearly 89 percent of audits were ordered before
municipal elections. A similar pattern holds when examining voters removed from rolls during au-
dits — nearly 90 percent of such removals took place during audits before municipal elections.29
In addition, official statements about voter audits focus almost entirely on municipal elections. In
sum, audits are most likely during municipal elections.
29This pattern also holds when examining annual data. Due to data availability, figures reflect
1997-2012 for audits (3 municipal and 3 federal elections) and 1997-2008 for voters removed (2
municipal and 2 federal elections). Regardless of timing, audits are conducted of municipalities.
Thus, even though the electoral districts in federal elections are entire states, municipalities are
the units at which audits occur.
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C No Precise Sorting Around the Threshold
As discussed in Section 4.2, the RDD method assumes smoothness (continuity) of potential out-
comes at the threshold. Given that sorting precisely around the threshold would be inconsistent
with the smoothness assumption, we build on the work of Lee (2008), investigate TSE procedures,
and employ McCrary (2008) density tests to show that such sorting is not observed.
Lee (2008)
Lee (2008) demonstrates formally that the smoothness assumption does not require the forcing
variable to be “as good as randomized.” Rather, randomized variation stems from agents being
unable to control precisely the forcing variable near the threshold (see also Lee and Lemieux
2009). In order words, sorting does not bias RDD estimates unless politicians have precise control
over the realized value of the electorate-population ratio. In order to have such control, a mayor
would need to change her municipality’s electorate precisely, and know exactly the population of
her municipality (or vice versa). We now discuss why this is impossible for both the electorate and
population figures in the Brazilian context. It should be emphasized, however, that so long as either
the numerator or denominator cannot be precisely known, then Lee’s (2008) analysis demonstrates
that the smoothness assumption holds.
Electorate (Numerator of Ratio)
During the time that electoral rolls are open to voter transfers, municipal officials cannot precisely
manipulate or even know exactly the number of voters that will be used in the numerator of the
electorate-population ratio. For the 2007-2008 wave of voter audits analyzed in this paper, the
TSE calculated the ratio using the electorate in June 2006, but the last date that transfers could be
processed was May 6, 2006. Before and after this May 6 “closing date” by which voters could be
imported, the electorate was in substantial flux due to factors that could not be precisely controlled
by municipal politicians. The following information is from official TSE documents:
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• During April 12-16, 2006, the TSE removed all voters who had missed the past three con-
secutive elections without justifying their absence or paying fines. Municipal officials would
not know how many voters had justified their absence or paid fines in other municipalities or
states just before the deadline.
• Until May 6, 2006, voters could transfer into a politician’s municipality and first-time voters
could register to vote. In addition, unbeknownst to the politician, her municipality’s voters
living elsewhere in Brazil could transfer out (subject to residency requirements). The former
would increase the municipality’s electorate, and the latter would decrease the electorate. A
surge of registrations and transfers happens in the days leading up to the closing of the rolls,
making it difficult for a politician to project how the electorate will fluctuate (especially
with regards to outward transfers conducted outside her own municipality). For example,
in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul, 20,676 voter transfers and 21,539 voter registrations
were processed in just ten days before the rolls closed in 2006, jointly representing nearly 3
percent of the state’s electorate.30
• During April 15-16, 2006, the TSE removed any voters whose death — in any location in
Brazil, not just in the voter’s municipality — had been reported by the electronic federal
death registry (Sistema Informatizado de Controle de O´bitos) in the prior month.
• During May 27-28 and June 24-26 of 2006, the TSE again removed any voters whose death
had been reported by the electronic federal death registry (Sistema Informatizado de Controle
de O´bitos) in the prior month. These removals happened after any voter transfers could be
executed on May 6.
• On June 22, 2006, the TSE concluded an additional data checking process, which removed
or added voters from the electorate whenever errors had been made.
30Data from the Tribunal Regional Eleitoral of Mato Grosso do Sul. Reported in “Mais de 53 mil
Pessoas Procuraram Carto´rios Eleitorais de MS,” RMT Online, May 6, 2006.
49
To sum up, the last day the TSE’s national, electronic voter database would permit any transfers
was May 6, 2006. Before this closing date of May 6, 2006, municipal politicians could precisely
control the electorate, given voter registrations, transfers, cancellations and deaths that happen
(some outside their locality). And after May 6, when no more voter transfers could be conducted,
the electorate continued to change due to TSE actions.
Population (Denominator of Ratio)
During the time that electoral rolls are open to voter transfers, municipal officials cannot precisely
know the population used in the denominator of the electorate-population ratio. For the 2007-2008
wave of voter audits analyzed in this paper, the electoral rolls closed to transfers on May 6, 2006.
But the census bureau (IBGE) did not release the July 2006 population estimate used in TSE cal-
culations until August 31, 2006, per regulations in Article 102 of Law 8443. Thus, the population
estimate was released nearly four months after the last date on which a politician could import vot-
ers. To calculate these population estimates, the census bureau employs a complex mathematical
model involving the fertility, mortality and migration rates not just of the municipality itself, but
also of other areas of the state.
Overall, municipal officials are unable to manipulate precisely or know exactly the electorate
or population figures used. Thus, Lee’s (2008) conditions for RDD as-if randomization described
above are sufficiently met.
Various TSE court cases also suggest that politicians have erroneously estimated the elec-
torate/population ratio. For example, the PMDB party in Iacanga, Sao Paulo, filed a court case
claiming that a voter audit should have been conducted because the ratio reached 80.91%, but the
TSE ruled that in fact the 80% threshold had not been exceeded.31
McCrary (2008) Density Test
Empirical analyses employing a McCrary (2008) Density Test also finds no evidence of manip-
ulation. This test examines whether or not “lumping” exists on one side of the discontinuity or
31Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, Resolution 21.583, December 9, 2003.
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Figure A.1: McCrary Density Test
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another, which might indicate that some units manipulate the forcing variable so as to avoid or
receive the treatment. If a substantially larger number of municipalities were clustered below the
80% threshold than above the threshold, for example, this would be evidence for mayors success-
fully manipulating the electorate-population ratio.
We find no evidence of this clustering. The p-value on the null hypothesis of “smoothness” of
the forcing variable—known as the McCrary Density Test—is .82 and .67 for the full sample and
the sample of municipalities where mayors are eligible for reelection, respectively. These results
are consistent with the absence of manipulation of the forcing variable. A visual depiction of this
test can be found in Figure A.1.
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Table A.1: First Stage Results
Dependent variable:
Revision
(1) (2)
Above .8 0.72∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Baseline 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Specification Difference-in-Means Local Linear
Observations 577 1,477
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
D First Stage Results
The first stage results for the regression discontinuity design are shown above in Table A.1. The
F-statistic on the excluded instrument is 725 and 651 for the local linear and difference-in-means
specifications, respectively.
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E Robustness to Alternative Bandwidths
In Figures A.2 and A.3, we report the robustness of our estimates to alternative bandwidth choices.
At the outset, it deserves emphasis that: (1) estimates using overly small bandwidths are likely to
have relatively larger standard errors due to small sample size; and (2) estimates using overly large
bandwidths are prone to bias as covariates become imbalanced above and below the threshold.
In Figure A.2, we show local linear estimates with bandwidths ranging from 0.5% to 6% in
steps of 0.5%. Bandwidths over 6% would include a very large proportion of all municipalities in
the estimation dataset and covariate balance noticeably deteriorates. For example, at a bandwidth
of 6.5%, 42% of all municipalities are included in the sample. Using our benchmark bandwidth of
4%, about 26% of all municipalities are included in the estimation sample.
For the difference-in-means estimator (Figure A.3), we test bandwidths between 0.25% and
2.75% in steps of .25%. Note that the difference-in-means estimator can be biased if the condi-
tional expectation of the outcome variable with respect to the forcing variable has a slope, an issue
mitigated with smaller bandwidths.
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Figure A.2: Robustness to Alternative Bandwidths (Local Linear Specification)
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Figure A.3: Robustness to Alternative Bandwidths (Difference-in-Means)
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F Descriptive Statistics
Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable n Mean Median SD
Electorate as % of Pop 5476 75.98 76.14 10.70
Turnout (08) as % of Pop 5547 68.01 67.28 10.86
Incumbent Party Won (08) 5547 0.34 0.00 0.48
Ran for Re-election (08) 4273 0.73 1.00 0.45
Incumbent Vote (08) as % of Pop 3112 33.39 32.76 10.84
Blank and Invalid (08) as % of Pop 5547 5.69 4.21 6.00
Incumbent Party Won (04) 5547 0.26 0.00 0.44
Turnout (04) as % of Pop 5547 63.83 63.74 10.86
Electorate Above 70 (06) as % of Pop 5504 4.83 4.81 1.55
Pct Poverty (00) 5494 46.47 44.76 22.85
Theil Index (00) 5494 0.52 0.51 0.11
Incumbent Re-elected (04) 5501 0.23 0.00 0.42
Rural Population (07) 5385 5325.39 3381.00 6002.17
Distance to State Capital 5494 253.23 227.49 163.64
Num of Previous Audits 5547 0.25 0.00 0.44
Transfers In (05-06) 5512 641.86 180.00 3256.79
Transfers Out (05-06) 5530 654.10 300.00 3006.31
Neighbor Munis Transfers Out (05-06) 5493 3129.60 1646.00 9823.51
Neighbor Munis Transfers In (05-06) 5493 3181.97 1178.00 10059.72
Blank and Invalid (04) as % of Pop 5547 4.41 3.75 4.01
Northeast Region 5547 0.32 0.00 0.47
Southeast Region 5547 0.30 0.00 0.46
Num of Neighboring Municipalities 5493 5.96 6.00 2.02
Population (08) 5547 33686.07 11131.00 197884.09
Electorate (06) as % of Pop 5504 74.03 74.52 9.79
Win Margin (04) as % of Pop 5426 8.22 5.98 7.54
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Figure A.4: Histogram of Forcing Variable
0
100
200
25 50 75 100 125
Electorate as % of Population
co
u
n
t Status
Audit
No Audit
57
G Alternative Specifications
In Tables A.3 and A.4, we demonstrate robustness of results using alternative specifications to those
used in the main text. Specifically, in Table A.3, we show the local linear estimates once we control
for state fixed effects and covariates that exhibited an imbalance of more than .1 standardized
differences. In Table A.4, we show our estimates when using a fifth order polynomial to model the
relationship between the outcome and the forcing variable with a bandwidth of 30%. Tables show
reduced form estimates (τˆA). Instrumental variable estimates (not shown) are larger and similarly
statistically significant.
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H Placebo Thresholds
As an additional test of the validity of the research design, we calculate treatment effects at placebo
thresholds which—if the design is valid—should all be close to 0. These placebo estimates (using
the local linear estimator) are shown in Figure A.5. Results do not change if we use the difference-
in-means estimator.
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Figure A.5: Placebo Thresholds
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I Additional Alternative Explanations Results
In figure A.6, we provide the results of additional tests of emigration as an alternative hypothesis.
First we employ data on number of transfers out of a municipality over a shorter and longer time
frame (2002-2007 and 1997-2007). Another potential test of the emigration hypothesis is whether
audits hindered incumbent performance more in municipalities where voters have a pattern of miss-
ing consecutive elections. As shown in Figure A.6c, treatment effects are not heterogeneous across
municipalities with above versus below-median “missing voters” (discussed in text). Overall, the
evidence does not support the emigration explanation.
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Figure A.6: Additional Tests of Alternative Explanations (Heterogeneity of RDD Estimates)
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Note: Figure A.6 suggests an audit’s effect does not significantly vary by whether municipality has
above-median values for alternative migration measures. Solid lines are 95% confidence intervals.
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J Blank & Invalid Votes versus Indifferent Voters
Figure A.7 demonstrates that voters casting blank or invalid votes are substantially less interested
in politics than voters casting votes for candidates. Data is drawn from 2010 Brazilian Electoral
Panel Study (Ames et al. 2013).
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Figure A.7: Blank & Invalid Votes versus Indifferent Voters
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Note: Data from 2010 Brazilian Electoral Panel Study. Entries reflect percentage of row; i.e., the
top circled entry indicates that 53 percent of respondents who reported casting Blank/Invalid votes
in the 2010 presidential election reported that they had no interest in politics (roughly double that
of Dilma Rouseff voters).
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K Change in Electorate Over Time
In Figure A.8, we show the evolution of the electorate around the discontinuity in the 5 years before
the audit wave (top panel) and the 5 years after the audit wave (bottom panel). As is evident from
the figure, immediately after the audits, municipalities above the discontinuity lose a substantial
part of their electorate. In the years following the audit, the difference between the two types of
municipalities diminish.
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Figure A.8: Evolution of the Electorate Over Time
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L Incumbent, Challenger, and Election Characteristics
To assess whether candidates and electoral competition in municipalities near the 80% threshold
are unusual on measurable characteristics, in Figure A.9 we present scatter plots showing the
distribution of four variables across a wide range of the forcing variable. We also plot a lowess
curve, which estimates the moving average of the variable (span parameter is set to .3). The four
variables are: vote margin in 2004 mayoral election, difference in total donations received by the
winner and runner up in 2008 mayoral election, incumbent mayor’s age in 2008, and the age of the
challenger (to the incumbent mayor) in 2008.
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Figure A.9: Incumbent, Challenger, and Election Characteristics
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M Discontinuity Plots for Selected Pre-Treatment Covariates
In Figure A.10, we show discontinuity plots for 8 pre-treatment covariates. These covariates are:
vote margin in 2004, log municipal budget per capita in 2006, public employees per capita in 2006,
incumbent age in 2008, challenger age in 2008, presence of an AM radio station, ratio of electorate
to number of city councilors, and average precinct size in 2008. Across all 8 covariates, we find no
evidence for sorting around the threshold.
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Figure A.10: Discontinuity Plots for Selected Pre-Treatment Covariates
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Figure A.11: Effect of Audit on Incumbent Reelection, Full Sample
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Figure A.12: Effect of Audit on Incumbent Decision to Run for Reelection, Full Sample
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Figure A.13: Effect of Audit on Change in Incumbent Vote Share, Full Sample
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Figure A.14: Effect of Audit on Change in Electorate, Full Sample
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Figure A.15: Effect of Audit on Change in Turnout, Full Sample
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